



**Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the UN
Geneva**

**Statement by Mr. Muhammad Omar, First Secretary,
at the Second Meeting of Subsidiary Body 1, Conference on Disarmament,
Geneva
31 March 2022**

Mr. Coordinator,

Thank you for giving my delegation the floor. We appreciate the manner in which you are chairing the meetings of Subsidiary Body 1.

We align ourselves with the statement made by my delegation on behalf of G-21 on the nuclear disarmament agenda of this Conference. I wish to add the following in our national capacity.

Following your proposal, my remarks today shall focus on developing understanding on areas of commonalities that can also realistically foster progress on the top priority of the international community i.e., nuclear disarmament.

Mr. Coordinator,

As you would recall from the first meeting of this subsidiary body, my delegation had drawn attention to the various aspects of arms accumulation and their impacts, as well as the state of play around nuclear disarmament.

We had pointed out the reasons for the lack progress on this highest priority at the multilateral level and the causes for backsliding which also continue to erode the sanctity of international legality on nuclear disarmament. Non-compliance by some states with non-proliferation norms and principles serves to compound matters, eroding strategic stability as well as hindering progress in the CD.

Mr. Coordinator,

Overcoming fundamental obstacles to progress in this vital area necessitates distinguishing the linkages between nuclear disarmament and the security considerations that drive states to acquire these weapons.

The fact that some states have been compelled to rely on nuclear weapons as deterrence in the face of asymmetry in conventional capabilities and the resultant threat perceptions cannot be ignored.

Crucially, nuclear disarmament can only be accomplished through faithful adherence to fundamental principles of arms control, the foremost being the attainment of equal and undiminished security for all States.

Mr. Coordinator,

The worrisome nature of strategic developments at the global and regional levels, along with pervasive drives of risks of an arms race, including a nuclear arms race, must serve as call for renewed efforts to move forward, rather than used as excuse for inaction or self-serving narratives or moves to deflect international attention to other issues.

Our deliberations in the five subsidiary bodies, as well as discussions in the Conference have elucidated that the conversation on cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament is inextricably tied to the mutually reinforcing relationship of various weapon systems in tandem with nuclear weapons, and their collective impact on the security of states, particularly in situations of asymmetry in conventional and nuclear capabilities.

Therefore, a roadmap which internalizes the intersectionality of these dimensions is a must for this Subsidiary Body (SB) and should be prioritized as a concrete deliverable in our report. Such a blueprint would address underlying factors and at the same time enable pursuit of a nuclear disarmament agenda that lives up to the avowed ethos of an international rules-based order. It would naturally be grounded in common understandings and areas of commonality, many of which are not novel innovations but proven formulas including going back to basics and sticking to fundamentals.

While we do not discount the daunting nature of the challenge in this endeavor, this subsidiary body remains fully capable of collating the fundamental components. In our view, the key elements that are essential to this roadmap are:

First, the nuclear weapon states must demonstrate a renewed commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament within a reasonable timeframe to revalidate the NPT bargain.

Second, as a pragmatic step towards disarmament, the nuclear weapon states need to halt future production and eliminate all existing stocks of fissile materials through a non-discriminatory Fissile Material Treaty.

Third, until nuclear disarmament is achieved, giving non-nuclear weapon states assurances that they will not be threatened with the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, by nuclear weapons states through a universal, unconditional, and legally binding treaty negotiated at the CD.

Fourth, the direct causal relationship of conventional weapons with nuclear arsenals necessitates concrete measures to institute balanced reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, especially at the regional and sub-regional levels.

Fifth, address the motives which drive States to acquire weapons to defend themselves, including perceived threats from superior conventional or non-conventional forces and the existence of disputes and conflicts with more powerful States.

Lastly, strengthening the international legal regime to prevent the militarization of outer space, and bringing cyber weapons and autonomous weapons under effective international control is central to avoiding the challenges of strategic entanglement.

Mr. Coordinator,

It is an evidentiary reality that the goal of a nuclear weapons free world that is achieved in a universal, verifiable, time-bound and non-discriminatory manner, needs to be pursued in a comprehensive and holistic manner in accordance with the principles agreed by SSOD-I. Without prejudice to my delegation's readiness to start work on a comprehensive nuclear weapons convention, we have presented the rationale and proposed key elements of a roadmap as a first step, developed by this subsidiary body, in support of this final goal at the CD.

Mr. Coordinator,

Since various delegations had presented their perspectives on the topic of nuclear disarmament verification, I take this opportunity to share my delegation's position.

It goes without saying that verification would be an essential element to assure compliance with any future agreements on nuclear disarmament. In this regard, a conceptual exploration and shared understanding on principles of NDV can be useful. It may even contribute towards verification aspects of an international instrument on nuclear disarmament.

Importantly, however, any work on NDV should not be seen as a precondition for the commencement of negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the CD in accordance with the SSOD-I Final Document.

Mr. Coordinator,

Nuclear disarmament verification itself can best be addressed in the context of a specific treaty regime, and not in an abstract manner or in a vacuum, nor as an end in itself. Verification has to be rooted in specific treaties.

The conclusions reached by the last GGE in its consensus report acknowledged, inter alia, that "the role of verification in advancing nuclear disarmament will be determined on a case-by-case basis in the context of the negotiations of legally-binding agreements in the area of nuclear disarmament". We remain constructively engaged in the work of the current GGE which commenced last month.

While the GGE would focus on its mandate over the next 18 months, the CD has its own role in bringing clarity, provide context and lend purpose to the efforts on verification through advancing substantive work in the CD, specifically on the when and how of nuclear disarmament.

At the same time, we have a universally agreed framework to anchor the verification work. Let me cite two examples. The consensus Final Document of SSOD-I states that “the form and modalities of the verification to be provided for in any specific agreement depend upon and should be determined by the purposes, scope and nature of the agreement”.

The UNDC, in its 1988 Principles of Verification, agreed that “Determinations about the adequacy, effectiveness and acceptability of specific methods and arrangements intended to verify compliance ... can only be made within the context of that agreement”.

As is evident, there is no one size fits all in verification, and the context i.e. the specific treaty shapes it. The work of the GGE should, therefore, continue to remain a conceptual exploration of principles, rather than turning it into an illusory pursuit of tenuous tools or institutions that are not needed.

It is only by anchoring our approach in the agreed principles can we truly hope to produce outcomes that serve the purpose of achieving nuclear disarmament and putting an end to the nuclear arms race.

I thank you, Mr. Coordinator.
